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Abstract 
This paper places Scottish Adult Support and Protection (ASP) policy in the context of 
debates about the nature of ‘vulnerability’ and its usefulness as a defining concept in law 
and social policy. It examines the construction of ‘adults at risk’ in ASP policy, using a 
comparison with the construction of children in Scottish child protection policy, on the one 
hand, and women in Scottish domestic abuse policy, on the other, to illuminate the nature 
of the vulnerability that ASP considers itself to be addressing. It then problematises this 
construction, drawing both on the social model of disability and on an ethic of care. It 
concludes that current ASP policy remains underpinned by unhelpful assumptions about 
disabled people, older people and people with mental or physical health problems. A more 
inclusive understanding of vulnerability would be more empowering to these people and 
others, in policies concerned with mistreatment and abuse. 
 
Points of interest 
 This article looks at why Scottish adult support and protection (ASP) policy sees some 
disabled people, in some situations, as more vulnerable to harm and abuse than other 
people. 
 The article compares what ASP policy assumes about this type of ‘vulnerability’ with what 
Scottish domestic abuse policy assumes about affected women, and what Scottish child 
protection policy assumes about children. 
 Ideas about vulnerability in ASP policy are more similar to ideas about children in child 
protection policy than ideas about women in domestic abuse policy. However, there are 
differences between ASP and child protection as well. 
 ASP policy could say more about oppression. 
 The three policies, and their separation from each other, are based on the idea that some 






Over recent decades, there has been increasing professional, research and policy concern 
with the safeguarding of adults considered to be more than ordinarily vulnerable to 
mistreatment or abuse. Scotland terms this field of activity ‘adult support and protection’ 
(ASP), and is currently unique in the UK in having established for it a specific, underpinning 
legislative framework, namely the Adult Support and Protection (Scotland) Act 2007 (the 
ASPSA). As it passed through the Scottish Parliament, there were heated debates over the 
need for this legislation and over its parameters. One such debate focused on the definition 
of the people to whom it would apply (Patrick and Smith, 2009). This paper concerns that 
debate, and the adequacy of the solutions that Scotland has found to it. It examines 
constructions of ‘adults at risk’ in Scottish ASP policy through a comparison with 
constructions of children and young people in Scottish child protection policy, on the one 
hand, and constructions of women in Scottish domestic abuse policy, on the other. This 
helps to illuminate current Scottish policy understandings of ‘vulnerability’ in respect of ASP, 
and to situate these understandings relative to wider debates about the nature of 
vulnerability and its usefulness as a defining concept in law, policy and professional practice 
across the UK and elsewhere. There is no assumption that the three policies relate to 
essentially similar phenomena, and in particular, there is no implication that some adults 
can be treated ‘like children’.  
 
There is growing Scottish and UK evidence about the prevalence of violence and other 
mistreatment against disabled people, older people and people with mental health 
problems (Disability Rights Commission and Capability Scotland, 2004; O'Keeffe et al., 2007; 
Sin et al., 2009). This is one important part of the context for what follows. Another 
important part is the nuanced range of ways in which policies are interpreted by 
practitioners and experienced by people thought to be at risk (Johnson, 2012; Mackay et al., 
2011). The intention here is not to deny the existence of violence and mistreatment, then, 
nor the need for some response, nor the multitude of levels at which any given response 
might be evaluated. Nonetheless, ASP policy is understood to be a significant and 
contestable framework within which various stakeholders address certain issues, and its 
particular formulation of these issues is the focus here.  
 
The paper is divided into five main sections. The first section outlines recent debates about 
the concept of vulnerability. The second section sets out the Scottish policy definition of an 
‘adult at risk of harm’, the term for a person to whom ASP applies. It traces the 
development of this definition out of earlier ideas about ‘vulnerable adults’, drawing 
connections with debates about vulnerability and adult protection and safeguarding 
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elsewhere. The third section is the longest and is further subdivided. It develops the 
comparative element of the paper, concluding with a summary of the nature of the 
vulnerability that policy attributes to ‘adults at risk’, and hence the nature of the problem 
that ASP sets out to address. The fourth section critiques this construction, drawing on 
principles of the social model of disability, on the one hand, and an ethic of care, on the 
other. A concluding section then summarises the implications of this critique for further 
debate and policy development. 
 
Vulnerability in policy, law and practice 
A number of concerns have been raised about the ways that ‘vulnerability’ is invoked in 
social policy, law and the practice of various professions. These might be grouped for 
present purposes into three main themes. The first relates to meaning. ‘Vulnerability’ is a 
term that can mean many things (Daniel, 2010; Fawcett, 2009). Indeed, there are debates 
over its proper meaning: for instance, the extent to which it describes a quality of 
individuals versus a quality of situations (Wishart, 2003), or the extent to which it can be 
considered mutually exclusive with prejudice or ‘hate’ in explaining crime against disabled 
people (Roulstone et al., 2011). However, it is often used by professionals and policy-makers 
in nebulous ways and without definition (Brown, 2011). This is worrying given that there can 
be practical consequences of being judged to be vulnerable in this type of context (Hasler, 
2004; Roulstone et al., 2011). 
 
Second, debate has focused on specifically who should be judged to be vulnerable for the 
purposes of a state response. In the context of English and Welsh legal judgements, Dunn et 
al. (2008) demonstrate extensions of the concept beyond those judged to lack mental 
capacity to those judged to be under constraint or duress, as well as those whose present, 
capable decisions are judged to threaten their autonomy in the longer term. These 
‘situational’ factors have been associated with vulnerability both in the presence and in the 
absence of ‘inherent’ factors (Dunn et al., 2008, p.239) thought also to contribute to 
vulnerability, and Dunn et al. (2008, p.241) caution that the concept thus defined is 
‘potentially infinite in scope and application’. Meanwhile, the association of vulnerability 
with some ‘inherent’ factors has itself been strongly challenged. For instance, Hasler (2004) 
argues that ‘vulnerability’ is one major vehicle whereby impairment comes to be associated 
with the need for professional ‘care’, which marginalises disabled people and excludes them 
from decision-making. Some people with learning difficulties and their advocates are 
particularly strong proponents of these arguments in respect of ASP or safeguarding 
(Hollomotz, 2009; Hough, 2012; Wishart, 2003). Specifically, they reject being categorised as 
vulnerable and/or in need of protection, because they associate this with deficit, 
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paternalism and stigma (Brown, 2011). This in turn connects with arguments that 
vulnerability has a significant subjective component (Spiers, 2000), and that people’s own 
views of themselves and their situations are therefore relevant to its definition (Dunn et al., 
2008). 
 
The third area of critique concerns the status of vulnerability as an exclusionary category at 
all. For instance, Fineman (2008) argues that US social policies based on assumptions of a 
‘liberal subject’, namely a rational, independent and invulnerable actor, with supplementary 
policies for those judged to fall short of this standard, are fundamentally flawed because 
they fail to connect with the realities of the human condition. She argues instead that all 
people experience vulnerability to a greater or lesser degree in different situations and 
across the life-course. Therefore, a ‘vulnerable subject’ would provide a better basis for 
conceptualising our responsibilities to each other and as a society (Dodds, 2007; Fineman, 
2008). There are strong links here with ideas about inter-dependency and an ethic of care, 
which have been drawn upon to challenge the particular conceptions of autonomy and 
independence that underpin some UK social policies (Anderson and Honneth, 2009; M. 
Barnes, 2011; Ferguson, 2007), as well as some perspectives arising from the independent 
living movement (Kittay, 1999; Reindal, 1999).  
 
‘Vulnerable adults’, ‘adults at risk’ and the ASP system 
During the refinement of the ASPSA, policy-makers engaged to a degree with the first and 
second of these groups of issues. Local authority-level policies that preceded the ASPSA in 
Scotland were usually targeted at ‘vulnerable adults’, similarly to approaches elsewhere in 
the UK. This concept could itself mean different things, but was often interpreted to refer to 
whole groups of people: for instance, all disabled people, all people over a certain age, 
and/or all people accessing community care services (Hasler, 2004; Slater, 2005). The ASPSA 
applies instead to ‘adults at risk of harm’, a concept developed to be less stigmatising and 
more contextualised than ‘vulnerable adults’ was understood to have become. An ‘adult at 
risk’ is a person over 16 who is a)unable to safeguard themselves; and b)at risk of harm from 
the actions or inactions of others or themselves; and c)more vulnerable to harm because 
‘they are affected by disability, mental disorder, illness or physical or mental infirmity’ 
(ASPSA s.3(1)). The Scottish Government contends that this definition avoids assumptions 
about inherent vulnerability and the stigmatising labelling of groups because all three parts 
of the definition must be met for a person to be judged to be an ‘adult at risk’ (Scottish 
Government, 2009b). It emphasises that ‘[s]omeone could have a disability but be able to 
safeguard their well-being etc. …It is the whole of an adult’s particular circumstances which 
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can combine to make them more vulnerable to harm than others’ (Scottish Government, 
2008b, p.12). 
 
To be clear, ASP is not solely about incapacity to make decisions, as Scots law defines this. 
Incapacity with respect to the relevant decisions is not a necessary condition to be judged to 
be an ‘adult at risk’ (Patrick and Smith, 2009). Being ‘affected by disability, mental disorder, 
illness or physical or mental infirmity’ is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Or, to put 
this another way, Scottish policy understands there to be something specific about people 
‘affected by disability, mental disorder, illness or… infirmity’, which renders them exclusively 
susceptible to the type of vulnerability at issue. However, it is for ASP professionals to 
determine whether this vulnerability is in fact a factor in any given case.  
 
‘Adults at risk’ in comparative perspective 
In its current ASP policy, then, the Scottish Government has made some attempt to engage 
with criticisms of earlier assumptions about vulnerability, as set out above. However, except 
that it coincides neither with mental incapacity nor with any other label traditionally 
attached to people by policies and services, the precise nature of the vulnerability 
understood to affect ‘adults at risk’ has still not been made clear. Furthermore, the 
assumptions of predecessor policies, themselves based on patchy empirical foundations, 
have been built on and refined with remarkably little comparison and cross-fertilisation of 
ideas from related fields (Bowes and Daniel, 2010; Johnson et al., 2010). 
 
This section seeks to infer more about Scottish policy understandings of vulnerability in an 
ASP context, therefore, by: 
a) examining the construction of an ‘adult at risk’, including as evidenced by the 
provisions thought appropriate for the protection and support of ‘adults at risk’; and 
b)  comparing this with the construction of children and young people in Scottish child 
protection policy, on the one hand, and women in Scottish domestic abuse policy, on 
the other. 
In drawing this comparison, there is no implication that these policies should approximate 
to each other. Neither, however, are they assumed to refer to necessarily different and 
discrete types of problem (see, for example, Humphreys and Absler, 2011; Thiara et al., 
2011). The comparison is of three frameworks for understanding and for professional 
practice. Professionals, policy-makers and others tend to view a situation through one such 
framework at a time, not least because of the divisions that exist in policy and service 
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structures and professional remits and roles (Daniel and Bowes, 2011; Johnson et al., 2010). 
Given this, and given that all policies inevitably construct problems and the people affected 
by those problems (Bacchi, 1999), comparison is a powerful medium for rendering explicit 
the ways this has been done. 
 
 Inherent characteristics, dependency and power in relationships 
This subsection explores ideas about vulnerability and inherent characteristics, dependency 
and power, first in child protection policy and then in domestic abuse policy. ASP policy is 
then situated relative to the poles that these points of comparison set up.  
 
The Scottish child protection system is underpinned by an understanding of childhood as an 
inherently vulnerable state (Brown, 2011; Daniel, 2010), in counterpoint to the assumed 
norm of the ‘liberal subject’ (Fineman, 2008). This is demonstrated by the existence of child 
protection as a state activity at all, and by its potential applicability to any person under a 
specified age, notwithstanding some variations in the upper bounds of ‘childhood’ in 
different aspects of the law (Daniel, 2010; Scottish Government, 2010). The vulnerability of 
children and young people is associated with characteristics assumed to be integral to 
childhood. These comprise: a)a greater susceptibility than adults to harm as a consequence 
of mistreatment; and b)a necessary dependence on adults, particularly parents, for care and 
control (Daniel, 2010). Evidence of the latter assumption lies in the broader Scottish policy 
and legislative framework for child care and support as set out in the Children (Scotland) Act 
1995. This legislation places primary responsibility with parents to ‘safeguard and promote 
[their children’s] health, development and welfare’, and requires the state to support 
parents in this role. Child protection activity is triggered by the occurrence or threat of 
‘significant harm’ (Guthrie, 2011), most frequently associated with failures in parental care, 
for instance abuse or neglect, and/or failures in parental control, for instance where 
children misuse substances or become involved in crime (Daniel, 2010; Scottish Executive, 
2002; Scottish Government, 2010). The need for parental and/or state control, then, is 
related in turn to a perception that children may make unwise decisions or put themselves 
at risk (James et al., 2008). 
 
The construction of women in Scottish domestic abuse policy is in many respects the polar 
opposite of this, epitomising ideas about the ‘liberal subject’ (Fineman, 2008). Domestic 
abuse is defined in Scottish policy as the physical, sexual and/or mental/emotional abuse of 
women by male partners or ex-partners (Scottish Executive, 2000, p.5). It is understood to 
be part of the broader problem of Violence Against Women, which is ‘a consequence of 
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continuing inequality between men and women, and …is also a barrier to achieving equality’ 
(Scottish Government, 2009d, p.1). No other factors are deemed causative of domestic 
abuse except this inequality, as manifested in sexist social attitudes and structures, 
combined with individual men’s misuse of the power these confer (Scottish Executive, 2003, 
p.6). Unlike children, women subject to domestic abuse are not understood to have 
inherent characteristics that render them more susceptible to harm and/or less able to 
defend themselves than others. They are not considered to be unusually prone to put 
themselves at risk, nor to be ordinarily dependent on care in their relationships with men. 
This means that parents as perpetrators, in child protection, are seen as behaving 
unacceptably, in the context of broader power hierarchies that are benign and 
unremarkable; that is, adults’ power over children is not itself a problem (V. Barnes, 2011). 
By contrast, male partners as perpetrators, in domestic abuse, are seen as behaving 
unacceptably, in the context of broader power hierarchies that are also unacceptable, and 
that contribute to and help legitimate their actions. 
 
Three broad points of contrast between constructions of children in child protection policy 
and constructions of women in domestic abuse policy might be summarised from the above, 
then, against which to compare constructions of ‘adults at risk’ in ASP policy. The first 
relates to whether individuals are considered inherently more susceptible to harm than 
others. The second relates to whether individuals are considered necessarily dependent on 
others, such that imbalances of power in their relationships with others are not understood 
to be problematic in and of themselves. The third relates to whether individuals are 
considered more prone than others to put themselves at risk. The understanding of 
vulnerability in ASP policy is unequivocally more similar to child protection than to domestic 
abuse policy with respect to the first and third of these. ‘Adults at risk’ are understood to be 
‘more vulnerable to being harmed’ as a direct consequence of being ‘affected by disability, 
mental disorder, illness or …infirmity’ (ASPSA s.3(1)(c)). Presumably, given their grouping, 
these are all intended to refer to inherent characteristics. ‘Harm’ for ASP purposes can 
include that arising from the actions or inactions of the individual themselves (ASPSA 
s.3(2)(b)), similarly to the assumption in child protection policy that a child may put 
themselves at risk, but contrasting with a premise of domestic abuse policy that judgements 
should not be passed on the woman’s actions and decisions: for instance her decision to 
remain in or return to an abusive relationship (Scottish Executive, 2000). 
 
Whether ‘adults at risk’ are constructed as more than usually dependent on others for care 
is somewhat less clear. Discussions of adult safeguarding and ASP have historically focused 
extensively on conceptions of vulnerability in the context of care-giving relationships and 
environments, and these remained a major focus of ASPSA implementation activities 
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(Scottish Government, 2009a). However, ASP policy is quite clear that ‘harm’ is not confined 
to these relationships and settings, and can in fact be perpetrated anywhere, by anyone. 
This raises questions about the basis for considering ‘harm’ a unified phenomenon; and 
child protection policy and domestic abuse policy model two alternative potential 
explanations for this. Child protection policy centres on parenting, as we have seen; 
however, this is not to the exclusion of the possibility that other adults could abuse. The 
unifying factor is children’s inherent vulnerability, and possibly an extension of the duty to 
care for children to all adults, albeit in a weaker form than applies to primary carers (Daniel, 
2010; Scottish Executive, 2002). On the other hand, domestic abuse and broader Violence 
Against Women policy sees men’s violence against women as unified by structural 
oppression, rather than by any necessary imbalance of power between women and men. It 
therefore designates work with individual abusers and victims/survivors as ‘secondary 
prevention’ and emphasises the over-arching importance of ‘primary prevention’ that ‘aims 
to change societal attitudes, values and the structures which produce inequality’ (Scottish 
Executive, 2003, p.5). ASP policy again seems more similar to a child protection than to a 
domestic abuse policy perspective on vulnerability when viewed in this light, given its focus 
on individual interventions as opposed to structural transformations (Scottish Government, 
2008b). Moreover, assumed effects of disablism, ageism and related oppressions seem 
unlikely explanations for imbalances of power between ‘adults at risk’ and the vast range of 
potential ‘harmers’ as envisaged by ASP policy, given that ASP relates to selected disabled, 
ill and older people and not to broader groups. Rather, any imbalances of power seem 
assumed to be inevitable, or at least not to be amenable to state-led transformation. 
 
Responses to harm and abuse 
This subsection examines the ways each policy constructs responsibilities for responding to 
instances of harm and abuse, including the role of the state, and the understandings of 
vulnerability implied by these constructions. Poles for comparison are again set up by 
examining first child protection policy, then domestic abuse policy, before ASP policy is 
situated relative to these. 
 
The Scottish state, via the child protection system, assumes responsibility for responding to 
actual or potential ‘significant harm’ to children and young people. It has greater powers in 
this than either parents or children themselves. In respect of parents, this is because child 
protection concerns are often associated with failings in parental care and control, but are 
less easily associated with structural failings within the present system (Daniel, 2010). That 
is, the state conceptualises itself as having numerous positive responsibilities to provide for 
children, and to some degree control them (Scottish Government, 2011), but as separate 
9 
 
from ‘the problem’ when child protection concerns arise (Baldwin and Spencer, 2005). 
Children’s own lack of decision-making powers within the child protection system stems 
from the policy assumption that children’s ‘best interests’ are paramount in decisions made 
about them, but that their views and wishes may not coincide with these. Notwithstanding 
this, children are constructed as having a developing capacity to formulate a view, which 
must be given weight in accordance with their age and development (Guthrie, 2011). 
 
In individual instances of domestic abuse, by contrast, policy assumes that affected women 
will find their own ways forward (Hearn and McKie, 2010). Professionals should facilitate 
women’s access to the available supports and legal remedies (Cull, 2003; Guthrie, 2011), but 
should avoid ‘assumptions or judgements about what they should do’ (Scottish Executive, 
2000, p.37). Additional principles underpin professionals’ roles where children are involved, 
but this moves the discussion back to situations viewed through a child protection and not a 
domestic abuse policy lens (Humphreys and Absler, 2011). Like any victim of crime, women 
subject to domestic abuse also have less than complete control over the responses to their 
situation of law enforcement agencies (ACPOS and COPFS, 2008). However, given that 
criminal prosecution plays a small part in securing the welfare of most women subject to 
domestic abuse (Cull, 2003; Hearn and McKie, 2010), routes to safety and recovery are still 
placed by policy largely in women’s own control. In this, again, we see the assumption of a 
liberal subject, whose autonomy is best supported by non-intervention (Anderson and 
Honneth, 2009; Fineman, 2008). Additionally, Scottish domestic abuse policy explicitly 
includes the state in its conceptualisation of factors that disempower women, for instance 
through exhortations in its professional guidance to ‘[e]xamine the structure of the service 
and seek means of service provision which do not support male violence by perpetrating 
[sic] inequality’; and ‘[a]ddress the cultural attitudes amongst staff which support male 
violence’ (Scottish Executive, 2000, p.40). This debars the state from also assuming the 
‘benign intervener’ role that it assumes in child protection work. 
 
ASP policy again bears an initial similarity with child protection policy in the above respects, 
and an initial dissimilarity with domestic abuse policy, in that it requires Scottish councils to 
inquire into concerns about ‘harm’ to a suspected ‘adult at risk’. These inquiries are not 
subject to the invitation or consent of the affected person, though consideration of their 
views is an important principle at this and other stages of the ASP process (Scottish 
Government, 2008b). Also like child protection policy and unlike domestic abuse policy, 
professionals are expected to lead the process of considering responses to ASP situations, 
through a standardised structure involving initial referral discussions, investigations, case 
conferences and protection plans (Joint Improvement Team, 2007; Scottish Government, 
2008a). Guidance does not consider it problematic for ASP professionals to assess situations 
10 
 
and recommend solutions in the course of implementing these processes; these functions 
are presented rather as a matter of routine (Joint Improvement Team, 2007). This all seems 
to suggest that the nature of the vulnerability of the ‘adult at risk’ may limit their ability to 
consider their own options, know what is best for themselves and/or to bring this about. 
Certainly when compared with domestic abuse policy, which rejects as a matter of principle 
the privileging of professionals’ means of problem-solving over affected women’s own 
(Scottish Executive, 2000), this appears to be the implication. Furthermore, the central role 
accorded to the state in delivering ASP is incompatible with any suggestion that its policies 
and services may be a part of the problem, at least when delivered as the state intends 
(Johnson, 2012). This again aligns ASP more closely with child protection than with domestic 
abuse policy. 
 
One major difference from child protection policy, however, is the formalisation of the right 
of a suspected ‘adult at risk’ to decline involvement in ASP processes. Specifically, in 
addition to the right to decline a medical assessment which is shared with certain children, 
suspected ‘adults at risk’ may decline to be interviewed as part of ASP inquiries or 
investigations, and may also decline most proposed interventions, if they are judged to have 
capacity to do so. Notwithstanding this, three ‘protection orders’ exist for short term 
removal of ‘adults at risk’ and longer-term ‘banning’ of perpetrators through the sheriff 
courts, which usually require the person’s consent but can be granted without it, if consent 
can be shown to have been withheld due to ‘undue pressure’ applied by the perpetrator or 
by someone else (Scottish Government, 2008b). Like considerations of a child’s ‘best 
interests’, then, considerations of ‘benefit’ to an ‘adult at risk’ can over-ride their stated 
wishes in certain circumstances. The rationale for this is that coercion, fear and misplaced 
trust or loyalty can disable people from protecting their own interests, including their 
autonomy in the longer term (Dunn et al., 2008; Patrick and Smith, 2009; Scottish 
Government, 2009c). However, no comparable state powers exist in relation to domestic 
abuse, where similar arguments could equally be made (Anderson and Honneth, 2009; 
Choudhry and Herring, 2006). The additional, inherent vulnerability of ‘adults at risk’ is 
presumably considered to justify the distinction here. Additionally or alternatively, other 
factors may prevent the application of these arguments to domestic abuse policy, despite 
their equal relevance. Such factors are revisited in the discussion below. 
 
Summary 
The preceding subsections have used a comparison with constructions of vulnerability in 
two related fields of policy to clarify the construction of vulnerability in Scottish ASP policy. 
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They have shown that people judged in their present circumstances to be ‘adults at risk’ are 
understood by ASP policy to be vulnerable in the sense that: 
a) they are more prone to being harmed than others; 
b) they may put themselves at risk; 
c) where harm is perpetrated by third parties, they lack power relative to those parties; 
and 
d) they need more help from professionals than others to assess their situations and 
formulate ways forward in response to harm. This legitimates more powers for 
professionals to override considerations of consent than exist for other adults; 
however, the baseline assumption remains that consent is required to implement 
any intervention. 
Current Scottish policy proceeds on the basis that this vulnerability is caused by factors 
inherent to ‘disability, mental disorder, illness or physical or mental frailty’, but only as 
these affect particular individuals in particular situations. A blanket association is not drawn 
between vulnerability and specified conditions or impairments. 
 
Discussion 
This paper now critiques the construction of vulnerability in Scottish ASP policy, as outlined 
above. It contends that, despite revisions in its approach to issues of adult vulnerability with 
the introduction of the ASPSA, ASP policy still makes unhelpful assumptions about disabled 
people, older people and people with physical and mental health problems. During the 
passage of the ASPSA itself, this contention tended to be met with counter-arguments at 
significant cross-purposes. Therefore, it is important to pre-empt some potential 
misunderstandings of the critique offered here. First, this critique is not based on a 
challenge to assumptions that all disabled, ill and older people in all circumstances are to be 
considered vulnerable in the ways outlined above. It recognises that policy does not make 
these assumptions. Second, this critique is not based on the contention that no disabled, ill 
or older people are ever vulnerable in this way. The evidence does not exist to support this 
argument and, indeed, ASP responses based on an assumption of vulnerability have already 
been found helpful by some people (Mackay et al., 2011). There are real dangers in 
idealising concepts like ‘independence’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘choice’ in movements intended to 
improve social services, in such a way that those people least able to aspire to these ideals 
are further disempowered (Ferguson, 2007; Fyson and Kitson, 2010). A blanket denial of 




The intention here, rather, is merely to contend that no adequate explanation has yet been 
offered for associating the potential to experience the above type of vulnerability with 
people ‘affected by disability, mental disorder, illness or …frailty’, as opposed to another 
grouping of people, whether narrower or broader. An example of a narrower grouping 
would be people lacking mental capacity to take the relevant decisions. An example of a 
broader grouping would include people who are not impaired or ill, but who misuse 
substances, for instance, or whose self-esteem and confidence in their abilities to effect 
change has been ground down by years of domestic abuse (Choudhry and Herring, 2006). 
Not only have the particular parameters of ASP policy been left unexplained, however, but 
the assumption appears to be that they require no explanation. This lends weight to 
contentions of the Disability movement that the state, via medical and welfare 
professionals, draws links between impairment and vulnerability with insufficient analysis of 
the basis for so doing (Hasler, 2004; Oliver and Sapey, 2006). Furthermore, the argument 
that exclusion, stigma and disempowerment are amongst the effects of this (Fawcett, 2009; 
Hollomotz, 2009) renders problematic the assumption that state officials are well-placed to 
tackle problems of vulnerability and harm, because they are not complicit in those problems 
(Johnson, 2012). Indeed, even allowing that vulnerability cannot be defined in the abstract, 
and that each situation must therefore be judged on its merits, the exclusive power of state 
officials to make these judgements is rendered problematic from the perspective of the 
Disability movement and its less benign and consensual model of society.  
 
A related way to account for the lack of clarity in ASP policy conceptualisations of 
vulnerability is to appreciate the interplay between official ideas that policy-makers are 
prepared to articulate and defend and other ideas, prevalent in wider society, to which they 
presumably also have regard. If widespread public opinion associates abuse of a disabled or 
older person with inherent vulnerability to which welfare professionals must respond, for 
instance, but considers that domestic abuse is a different type of problem, in which women 
are freely able to ‘just leave’ (Murray, 2008), considerable pressure is exerted to construct 
these things differently in policy responses. Anticipation of differential public censure of 
state inaction should tragedies occur might be envisaged to be a factor here. Conversely, 
there would likely be much greater public consternation, and more widespread demands for 
justifications and assurances of safeguards, if ‘disability, mental disorder, illness or …frailty’ 
was removed as a criterion for more directive state intervention in situations of violence, 
harm and abuse. 
 
Perhaps, however, this is precisely the debate that we need to have. To be more specific, if 
no definitive reason can be articulated for including ‘disability, mental disorder, illness or 
…frailty’ as a criterion for ASP intervention, perhaps we need to consider what the policy 
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would look like, should it be removed. One conclusion from this exercise might be that ASP 
is paternalistic and detrimentally counter to liberalism. The policy might then be re-defined 
within stricter bounds. For instance it might be confined to situations where adults lack 
capacity, as was the wish of some campaigners during the passage of the ASPSA. This is 
probably a simplistic solution, however, given the very real concerns that proponents of ASP 
policy and others have raised about situational as opposed to inherent vulnerability (Dunn 
et al., 2008), and the questionable equation of non-intervention with respect for human 
rights in circumstances where individuals are disempowered relative to their abusers and by 
their abuse (Choudhry and Herring, 2006; Fyson and Kitson, 2010; Patrick and Smith, 2009). 
The contention here is not that these issues do not exist, then, but that attempts to delimit 
the groups to whom they might apply distort them and sidestep their full import.  
 
This brings us back to the idea of vulnerability as something that unites us, rather than as 
something that divides us (Dodds, 2007; Williams, 2001). It connects with proposals to re-
shape whole swathes of social policy, by  rejecting the myth of the ‘liberal subject’ and the 
opposition between ‘independent’ individuals whose ‘autonomy’ is best supported by being 
left alone, on the one hand, and individuals who need support or care, on the other 
(Anderson and Honneth, 2009; Fineman, 2008; Kittay, 1999). Policies re-shaped in this way 
would take networks of care and responsibility as their baseline (Sevenhuijsen, 2000), 
reversing the need to root provisions for support and/or protection in the construction of 
groups or individuals who are ‘not like us’ (Hasler, 2004, p.230). The practical implications of 
these ideas would touch every level of society, and are well beyond the scope of this paper. 
They also need more extensive debate. This is particularly so given their tensions with 
certain ideas and strategies of the Disability movement (Morris, 1997; Williams, 2001), and 
potentially also the Violence Against Women movement. However, the shortcomings of all 
three of the policies discussed above, especially when viewed in comparative perspective, 
add weight to calls for further exploration of such models.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the construction of vulnerability in Scottish ASP policy through a 
comparison with the construction of children and young people in Scottish child protection 
policy, on the one hand, and women in Scottish domestic abuse policy, on the other. It has 
found that ASP is identical neither to child protection nor to domestic abuse policy in its 
construction of vulnerability; however there are more similarities with the former than the 
latter overall. The rationale for this is unclear. Hence the findings of the paper support 
related work that promotes a comparative and lifespan approach, as one means of 
interrogating policy and refining its assumptions (Bowes and Daniel, 2010; Daniel and 
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Bowes, 2011; Johnson et al., 2010). Such an approach has implications for all three of the 
policies discussed; however the focus here has been on ASP. 
 
The paper has challenged the power of ASP professionals in a number of respects. One 
important challenge has been to the exclusive prerogative of professionals to identify 
vulnerability in respect of suspected ‘adults at risk’. This sits uneasily both with a social 
model of disability and with understandings of vulnerability as a subjective experience 
(Spiers, 2000). One practical, micro-level implication is that people’s own views must be 
heard, not merely when deciding how to respond to vulnerability and harm, but also when 
deciding whether and in what sense to consider a person vulnerable at all (Dunn et al., 
2008). At a broader level, much more collaborative work needs to take place with disabled 
people, older people and people with mental health problems to design and deliver 
services, beginning with fuller exploration of the ways, if any, that individuals and groups 
consider themselves to be vulnerable or ‘at risk’. An oppression perspective, similarly to the 
domestic abuse policy model, might perhaps appear in these accounts more extensively 
than it does current ASP policy (e.g. Roulstone et al., 2011; Thiara et al., 2011). 
 
At the broadest of levels, an ethic of care perspective and an acknowledgement of universal 
vulnerability has been proposed as a useful corrective for future policies concerned with 
protection from violence, harm and abuse. Specifically how this would look requires further 
debate. This is a proposal at the political level, importantly (Lloyd, 2006, p.1179), because 
the difficulties with ASP identified in this paper have been at the political level. Whilst the 
ways people experience ASP services are significantly affected by the relationships they 
negotiate with ASP practitioners and by the judgements of those practitioners on the 
ground (Mackay et al., 2011), the structures within which this takes place constrain these 
interactions in particular ways. These structures ought therefore to be based on more 
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